Sanctions and Adaptation: How Sanctions Competition Is Evolving


Strategic Question

Is Russia adapting and strengthening its energy logistics amid tightening Western sanctions?

Key Judgements

  • Russia is expanding its LNG transportation network to preserve exports amid expanding Western sanctions.

  • Russia’s investment in LNG transport capacity indicates it anticipated further Western sanctions and implemented an adaptation strategy.

  • Sanctions effectiveness depends on limiting a state’s ability to adapt its logistical networks as well as restricting energy flows.

Core Assessment

Russian purchases of liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers reveal deliberate efforts to strengthen the country’s transport networks as part of its sanction adaptation strategy. Western measures have increasingly targeted the maritime networks supporting Russia’s energy exports. These strategic purchases reveal that Russia is aiming to preserve energy flows amid the recent UK sanctions and prior to EU measures due to come into effect in January 2027.

Russia is reportedly expanding its LNG carrier fleet through second-hand acquisitions and domestic shipbuilding, demonstrating how the country is adapting its logistical network amid tightening Western sanctions.

Background

Western sanctions on Russia have increasingly targeted the country’s energy sector and logistical networks. With new sanctions set to be implemented in January 2027, Russia has undertaken preparatory investment to preserve energy flows. While Western sanctions may slow Russian energy flows, Russia’s efforts to adapt its transport network indicate that it may continue sustaining its war efforts and economy. The development highlights that the effectiveness of sanctions depends not only on disrupting current energy flows but also on limiting a state’s ability to adapt its logistical networks.

Strategic Assessment

In June, the UK expanded sanctions against Russia by further targeting networks transporting LNG. While sanctions against Russia’s oil tanker fleet aligned with existing measures implemented by the EU, the addition of LNG carriers reflected an evolving focus on disrupting Russia’s energy logistical networks. 

Prior to the recent sanctions, reports indicated that Russia commenced accumulating its LNG tanker fleet in early 2025, purchasing seven carriers, with an additional six added over the last five months, increasing domestic LNG capacity. Russian purchases suggest the Kremlin anticipated further Western restrictions and the need to adapt its carrier base and logistical network through investment to preserve energy exports.

Russia’s acquisition of LNG tankers through third parties suggests that sanctions are met with adaptation rather than completely imposing energy restrictions. Adaptation measures include the acquisition of older carriers, reduced reliance on Western insurance and documentation, opaque ownership structures, vessel reflagging, and ship-to-ship transfers. LNG transportation is notably more complex and poses numerous challenges, which highlights that Russia’s adaptation is also able to evolve to ensure energy flows remain.

LNG transport requires specialised carriers capable of maintaining LNG at approximately  -162. Russia’s vessels operate in the Arctic, which adds the complication of having vessels with hulls resistant to thick ice. Despite the complexity, Russia’s continued investment demonstrates the technical capability required to maintain LNG transport despite complex operational requirements. Although Russia appears capable of adapting to sanctions, doing so takes considerable time, investment, and technical expertise.

Russia’s adaptation strategy may influence how sanctions are imposed in the future. Even though Russia appears to be adapting, it comes as a cost and inconvenience. Future sanctions may need to be even wider than anticipated and take into account how a state will anticipate or react and whether these measures can be mitigated. The interaction between sanctions vs. adaptation suggests that they cannot be treated as fixed but rather as an evolving competition that requires constant review to adjust to methods that preserve economic or energy activity. Sanctions competition is not solely to restrict movement or activity but to outpace a state's ability to respond and adapt.

What to watch

  • Russian expansion of LNG logistical networks through additional purchases and domestic shipbuilding.

  • Additional Western sanctions targeting Russia’s LNG network, including third parties, support services, and carriers.

  • Western enforcement measures targeting LNG vessels, including inspections, restrictions and sanctions implementation.

  • Changes in Russian LNG transport routes and export volumes following the January 2027 EU sanctions. 

Strategic Indicator

Russian Energy Logistics Adaptation

Assessment ▲ Increasing

Western sanctions have primarily targeted Russian oil flows until more recently. Even though restrictions are expanding to LNG tankers, Russia appears to have anticipated these measures through the acquisition of LNG carriers starting as early as the beginning of 2025. Russia has managed to continue strengthening its logistical networks through many of the same measures the country uses to sustain its oil fleet, such as reflagging and opaque ownership structures. The technical complexity of LNG transport makes Russia’s continued fleet expansion significant.

Russia’s preparations have occurred over several years, indicating foresight and strategic planning rather than a reactive response to sanctions. Although European restrictions will take effect in January 2027, Russia’s investment in its transport networks suggests that it will likely retain some capacity to sustain LNG flows despite tighter restrictions.

Sources

Government Sources

Industry Sources

News Reporting

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