Red Sea Shipping Data Indicates Commercial Disruption Following Houthi Attacks
Strategic Question
Are the Houthis capable of significantly influencing shipping behaviour?
Key Judgements
Geopol Lens assesses that Houthi attacks have reduced commercial shipping transits, with operators reassessing potential risks in the Red Sea.
Indicators suggest reduced traffic could increase shipping costs as insurance premiums adjust to the heightened situation and operators adapt routing decisions in the immediate term.
Four very large crude carriers (VLCC) exited the Red Sea bound for ports in China and one in Pakistan, suggesting certain operators are assessing risk differently. Whether political alignment or destination influences decisions and passage remains unclear.
Core assessment
Latest Kpler shipping data indicates reduced marine traffic through Bab al-Mandeb. Commercial operators are likely reassessing transit risks, insurance premiums, and operating costs. Houthi threats and subsequent attacks have already influenced shipping behaviour, with some vessels turning back and passage volumes rapidly decreasing. Despite the reduction in marine traffic, commercial responses have been mixed, with several VLCCs continuing to transit the Red Sea.
Background
Following Houthi threats against Saudi Arabia, Kpler data reported by Reuters shows on July 26 only 11 commodity vessels transited Bab al-Mandeb, the lowest daily total in months. While several vessels turned back shortly after the Houthi declaration, four VLCCs subsequently transited the Red Sea bound for China and one for Pakistan.
Strategic Assessment
The Houthi declaration in support of Iran has had an immediate effect on commercial shipping behaviour. Similar to the Strait of Hormuz, disruption and uncertainty are now becoming part of the operating environment in the Red Sea. Although the attacks have been limited, the Houthi strategy demonstrates that a non-state actor can shape shipping without having complete control of a passage of water. Threats alone have proven sufficient to cause disruption by altering commercial decision-making, indicating that the threshold between harassment and influence is low.
Shipping companies may take time to adjust to the operating conditions, having to balance risk and commercial costs. While the initial Houthi threats were against Saudi Arabia, with attacks on Saudi state oil companies, it is unclear if the threats extend to shipping carrying Saudi cargo, calling at Saudi ports, or linked to Saudi interests. With several vessels having exited bound for Asia, commercial operators will need to determine if Saudi land-based oil infrastructure remains the target or if the Houthi will extend this to Saudi-linked vessels. If insurance premiums significantly increase operating costs, operators may reroute using the Suez Canal, which is likely to still increase costs and add voyage time.
Vulnerabilities in maritime security have been exposed through chokepoint disruption. Even with U.S. naval capacity in the region, the Houthi-Iranian strategy demonstrates that military responses alone may still have difficulty reducing commercial risk. Maritime data has shown that operators will react to perceived risk and limited attacks.
Approximately between 5 and 8% of seaborne oil flows through the Red Sea, much destined for Asia. Sustained disruption could increase freight costs and extend voyage times, which will likely impact Asian markets; there is likely additional pressure and price increases alongside the impacts from the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. For Saudi Arabia, an alternative route exists through the Suez Canal, although this could slow regional oil flows through congestion and add significant voyage time, leading to a rise in costs. Any rerouting impacts on supply chains remain uncertain given the Houthi declaration was only recent and will depend on whether reduced transits persist.
Disruption in the Red Sea strengthens Iran’s position in a dual strategy. The current disruption in Hormuz continues, with the added double chokepoint disruption; Iranian–Houthi economic leverage will increase. Regional responses remain limited; however, the previous Houthi strikes on vessels between 2023 and 2025 led to a U.S. military response. Any prolonged disruption will likely add pressure to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which both rely on the Red Sea for oil flows. Given the status of Hormuz, the current conditions in the Red Sea, and pressure on Asian markets, an international diplomatic and possibly military response may be an option.
In the near term, shipping data will demonstrate how much influence the Houthi have in the Red Sea. Increased commercial shipping volumes transiting the Red Sea will indicate that confidence is recovering; however, this trend would need to be sustained volumes. Similar to Hormuz, a single Houthi attack could rapidly impact transits, and with an alternative route through the Suez Canal, commercial shipping may prefer a secure diversion despite the additional costs and time. Broader impacts will be reflected in Asian industrial market responses with how they manage oil and industrial supplies.
What to Watch
Marine data indicating transit volumes, vessel types, and changes in commercial shipping routes.
Houthi attacks on specific targets, differentiating between Saudi oil infrastructure and vessels.
Whether Saudi-linked vessels carrying cargo or calling at ports are able to transit safely.
Saudi Arabian military response to attacks.
International diplomatic or military responses.
Asian and industrial markets responding to energy supplies and freight costs.
Strategic Indicator
Red Sea Marine Disruption
Assessment ▲ Increasing
The Houthis’ declaration to target Saudi Arabia's interests in the Red Sea has decreased marine traffic and is shaping commercial shipping behaviour. Disruption in the Red Sea demonstrates a non-state actor's capacity to influence marine spaces and that threats can be used as leverage, forcing commercial operators to adapt.
Both Middle Eastern chokepoints now require heightened risk assessments and associated costs for operators. For Asian markets dependent on Middle East energy, the Red Sea disruption highlights that energy supply chains are exposed to conflict and uncertainty.