2025 U.S. National Security Strategy: A Pivot and Regional Reset
Key Takeaways
The NSS marks a shift from global leadership to a selective, self-interested foreign policy.
“Flexible Realism” introduces strategic ambiguity in how the U.S. engages, making it less predictable for allies and competitors.
The Western Hemisphere is a region where the U.S. will be assertive to limit external influence.
The Indo-Pacific is central to shaping U.S. economic and military strategy.
Allies are expected to increase defence spending, reflecting a move towards security burden-sharing rather than guaranteed U.S. support.
Europe remains a partner, but one that is strategically dependent, requiring realignment.
The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a structural departure from the post-Cold War American universalist grand strategy. Instead of an overarching global vision of leadership on shared challenges, the document presents a region-by-region approach to trade, shared defence responsibilities and alliances, and domestic growth priorities. This is all framed through the lens of national interest, or “America First.” The strategic policy is not built on ideological alignment; instead, it seeks to preserve strategic positioning through selective engagement, economic leverage, and soft power capacity.
Flexible Realism with Strategic Ambiguity
Central to the strategy is a flexible foreign policy, one in which the U.S. will determine how it responds based on national interests. The document describes the strategy with terms such as pragmatic, realist, principled, muscular, and restrained. However, it simultaneously claims to reject categorisations such as pragmatism, realism, idealism, hawkishness and dovishness. There is now more U.S. ambiguity regarding international relations and future global developments. How the international community interprets this may prove difficult. This is particularly evident in the document’s outline of the principle of “Flexible Realism” when dealing with other nations.
The acknowledgement that “not everything matters equally…” may mean that regions, countries, and allies cannot expect American intervention when a crisis occurs. There are many variables to be taken into account: economic impact, military contributions, military risk, and diplomatic ties. Countries that have traditionally relied on U.S. support will now be reassessing how they fit into the strategy.
The NSS links external power to domestic strength. Bringing back industry, securing borders, and energy independence are viewed as necessary for an effective foreign policy. The policy reflects a reassessment of perceived U.S. overextension, and a shift towards accepting the limits of military interventionism and valuing diplomacy.
In the Trump administration’s view, the U.S. has been treated unfairly through globalisation, trade imbalances and by allies that have not maintained defence spending. Effectively, this is a reset of traditional international relations and what some may interpret as a retreat inward.
Region by Region
One of the most interesting features of the NSS is the regional framing. Rather than treat all theatres as equally important, there is a regional hierarchy that is identified by differing levels of strategic importance and threat perception. By doing this, traditional allies and partners can expect a shift in relations and priorities, while also signalling to others, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, changes are coming. However, the region with the most focus is the Indo-Pacific.
The U.S. has attempted to pivot towards Asia since the late stages of the George W Bush administration and throughout the following Obama administration. Most notably, there was the attempt to form the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact with 12 Pacific Rim countries. Yet, there is a more complex posture towards what is now the main theatre, where China is framed as a competitor in technological, economic, and military domains.
The Asian theatre is focused on China and the U.S.’s ability to rebalance its economic relationship, bring back manufacturing and economic independence. With about one-third of global shipping passing through the South China Sea, there are obvious concerns that any disruptions would have serious repercussions on the U.S. economy. To achieve economic objectives and build a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, the policy outlines a requirement to have deterrence to prevent conflict.
As with the U.S. budget increase demands on NATO, Asian partners can expect much of the same. The policy is consistent in that partnerships will go beyond purely economic and trade ties, but require greater military contributions from partners. In particular, the First Island Chain is singled out as needing a level of military deterrence that the U.S. cannot provide alone.
Regional allies have been put on notice to “step up and spend” to form a “collective defence.” If regional allies spend more on their own defence, the U.S. potentially gains from potential defence purchases. However, it is not only the First Island Chain countries that receive focus but also “the Quad”.
India, Australia, Japan and the U.S. make up “the Quad” and add another layer of encirclement. Although the group is briefly mentioned, it signals the intention to have better commercial and other relations with India, with the objective of having India contribute to Indo-Pacific security. With India bordering China and being a nuclear power there are obvious U.S. incentives to develop a stronger relationship. While the policy avoids framing China specifically in confrontational terminology, it indicates the motivation to work with regional partners to prevent the domination of the region by a single competitor.
Despite implying that greater military and economic relationships would be beneficial, the NSS avoids explicit security guarantees. The emphasis is on increasing deterrence through alliances, a stronger U.S. presence, freedom of navigation, particularly of maritime chokepoints. At the same time, the U.S. policy is maintaining some strategic ambiguity. It gives the U.S. flexibility to assess and manage potential escalation. The policy highlights that economic and military geography are inseparable.
The Western Hemisphere: Monroe to the Trump Corollary
Perhaps the regional policy surprise was the approach towards the Western Hemisphere after “years of neglect” in order to restore American power. Unlike Europe or the Indo-Pacific, which feature as partners, Latin America appears as an American backyard that will be a managed security space. Latin America’s elevation to a region of concern has invoked a modern version of the Monroe Doctrine, which is described as a “Trump Corollary,” and indicates intent. Without naming external influences, such as China, Russia and Iran, these “Non-Hemispheric” actors are framed as destabilising forces that disadvantage the U.S. economically, and also pose a strategic security threat. The U.S. will deny any threatening capability, force presence, or control of strategic assets.
However, there are other non-state threats that are also identified. The NSS indicates a willingness to form partnerships to address other external threats. Although no partners are identified, the approach is to enlist regional champions to create stability, including security on land and at sea, as well as stopping illegal migration, combating cartels and stopping drug flows. In turn, the policy intends to “reward” governments or political parties whose views align with the strategy. Economic incentives may play a part in forming partnerships.
The U.S. aims to use various economic measures to improve economic reciprocity. Through “commercial diplomacy” including trade agreements and tariffs, the intention is to build a Western Hemisphere that attracts American investment and where the region views the U.S. as its “economic and security partner of choice.” Other measures such as pressuring foreign companies that construct infrastructure, and identifying business opportunities for American companies highlight the increasing competition in the region.
Any U.S. engagement will come with conditions that include halting dealings with outside influences, such as key infrastructure, purchases of strategic assets, ports, and control of any military infrastructure. The policy notes the difficulty in trying to reverse some relationships; nevertheless, the intention is that the U.S. will make efforts to develop partnerships, even with those that have ideological differences.
Partner, Problem or Liability: Make Europe Great Again
In Europe, much has been made of specific parts of the criticism levied. In particular, what drew attention was not the U.S. claims of European economic decline, but the framing that Europe is facing “civilisational erasure.” The factors causing this civilisational collapse are similar to the culture wars, which have caused internal political division. The NSS attributes some of these factors as threatening Europe’s very existence. That Europe would be “unrecognizable in 20 years or less” and that “certain NATO members will become majority non-European” would likely be seen as hyperbolic to many on the continent. Many would not be surprised, given the difficulties between NATO and the U.S. to agree on the Ukraine war, especially since Vice President Vance’s February speech.
The European Union is not viewed as a unifying mechanism, but instead the NSS views it as trending towards a problematic body. According to the NSS, European decline is being fast-tracked through failed migration policy, censorship of free speech, political suppression, falling birthrates, loss of national identity and confidence, not to mention the undermining of political liberty and sovereignty. In fact, demographic concerns are such, that the policy outlines that some European countries could become non-European, therefore changing traditional alliances.
In response to U.S. criticisms, Europeans could also point to the migration challenges as partially caused through U.S. intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. Nevertheless, all this under the subheading of “Promoting European Greatness”.
Despite the criticism, Europe remains an important partner but the role is recalibrated. Burden sharing is not a diplomatic preference; it is a strategic necessity. The first Trump administration had demanded more input from NATO partners. Although some have acted on this more recently, it is clearly not fast or wide enough with some countries “doubling down” on their positions. The U.S. outlines concerns that the current trajectory could mean European countries will not be economically or militarily strong enough to remain real allies. Currently Europe is a U.S. ally, but this is at risk through flailing economies, military weakness, perceived internal discord, over regulation, political suppression and a lack of confidence.
To illustrate the lack of self-confidence, the NSS highlights the Ukraine war. Europe, through NATO, is large, militarily powerful and has a “significant hard power advantage over Russia” except nuclear arms. It indicates a frustration towards European leaders and their inability to achieve stability on the continent, which according to the NSS, will require U.S. diplomatic engagement. European indecision or lack of confidence may be an issue, but the U.S. has also tried to reach an agreement to the conflict without success. The war is extremely complex, and both the U.S. and Europeans have struggled to make progress with the Russians.
A New Direction
The NSS document reflects a U.S. that acknowledges that it can no longer play the role of the past. Recalibrating relationships, pivoting, or perhaps even refocusing on its own hemisphere, the U.S. is now less concerned with global leadership. Requiring more military contributions from partners could lead to global rearmament or an arms race, which the U.S. appears to be willing to participate in through sales. In doing so, the U.S. believes it can rebuild a stronger domestic economy. The U.S. also views stronger allies as a form of deterrence. By rearming and selectively controlling strategic spaces, the U.S. is prioritising enforcement, but under the threshold of war.
How this approach will enhance global stability remains to be seen. For now, the U.S. strategy signals a country interested in transactions, prepared for selective enforcement and decisive action when its interests are at stake, but not necessarily willing to take risks for the sake of the global order.